Barry Appleton: New U.S. National Security Strategy should frighten Canadian policy-makers

At the FIFA World Cup draw in Washington, D.C., on Friday, American, Canadian and Mexican leaders smiled together in a tableau of hemispheric partnership. But imperial strategy rarely announces itself at press conferences — it announces itself in doctrine.

The new United States National Security Strategy, released last month, is such a doctrine. Canadians must read it carefully, because it describes an architecture of American dominance that sits in sharp contrast to the smiling theatre of the moment.

The strategy rests on pillars that demand Canadian attention: a reinvigorated Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere, a technology-centred national security doctrine built around U.S. dominance of artificial intelligence, compute power and the cloud infrastructure that enables them, and an extraterritorial approach to technology standards that binds partners tightly to the U.S. innovation economy.

The strategy declares that the United States will “assert and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine” to keep the hemisphere free of “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets.” These assets are defined expansively: ports, infrastructure and “strategic assets broadly defined.”

The document states bluntly that, “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity.” For Canada —  which is attempting to build sovereign digital capabilities and diversify investment in critical minerals, cloud architecture and AI — this is a structural claim over the arteries of the continental economy.

The strategy goes further. It assigns a global mission: American technology and standards in AI, biotechnology, and quantum computing must “drive the world forward.” Washington is signalling that its domestic regulatory choices will be projected outward as expectations for allies. Access to American capital markets and the innovation ecosystem may be withheld if others don’t bend to Washington’s will.

The implications for the 2026 CUSMA review are profound. Washington will likely press for restrictions on Canada’s ability to regulate cloud services, require data localization or mandate transparency for AI systems. These are not niche files. They are the prerequisites for value-added growth in every major sector.

For Canada, which is already experiencing a slow bleed of prosperity, the strategy lands like a diagnostic report. It identifies the very systems that Canada has neglected: digital infrastructure, value-added industries, sovereign compute and the regulatory tools that determine who captures economic rents in the modern economy.

Canada’s productivity is stagnating. Our value-added sectors remain underdeveloped. Intellectual property is draining out of the country. We export raw commodities and repurchase imported innovation at significant mark-ups. Our digital infrastructure is largely foreign-owned, foreign-operated and governed by foreign law.

If Canada enters the 2026 review without a sovereign digital and economic framework, we will negotiate from a position of weakness. Four priorities should guide Canadian policy.

First, we must recognize that the U.S. National Security Strategy signals a long-term American project to shape the rules of the Western Hemisphere, including the digital economy. Canada must prepare a sovereign position before the negotiating theatre begins. Reactivity is not viable when facing a partner that has elevated trade to the status of national security.

Second, we must build a domestic legal architecture to defend Canadian digital and economic sovereignty. This means legislation governing data flows, cloud jurisdiction, AI accountability and foreign ownership of strategic digital assets.

Canada cannot negotiate what it has not codified. We need an institutional framework that elevates strategic foresight to the centre of trade and technology policy — a whole-of-government approach mobilizing expertise from industry, academia and civil society.

Third, we need to pursue technological non-alignment. The European Union’s AI Act and emerging Asia-Pacific data governance models offer alternatives that help protect democratic oversight and sovereignty.

Through mutual standards recognition and interoperability protocols, Canada can position itself as a reliable, neutral actor in global data diplomacy — escaping the gravitational pull of great-power technological blocs.

Finally, we must prepare for pressure. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States may use access to supply chains, defence co-operation and AI collaboration as leverage.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s statements confirm that trade change is coming. Effective Canadian policy must acknowledge this asymmetry rather than deny it. Only then can Canada negotiate with clarity rather than illusion.

The smiling faces in Washington last week will fade from memory within days. The National Security Strategy will not. It will shape American trade policy, investment screening and diplomacy for years. Ottawa must read the doctrine, not the smile — and begin preparing now.

National Post

Barry Appleton is an international trade lawyer at Appleton & Associates International Lawyers LP, a distinguished senior fellow and co-director of the Center for International Law at New York Law School and a scholar and fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.